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MISCEGENATION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND SCIENCE
By JEROLD D. CUMMINS AND JOHN L. KANE, JR.t
"Any person, firm, or corporation who shall be guilty of print-
ing, publishing, or circulating printed, typewritten, or written mat-
ter urging or presenting for public acceptance or general informa-
tion, arguments or suggestions in favor of social equality or inter-
marriage between whites and negroes, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dol-
lars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the court." - Mississippi Code,
Section 2339 (1959)
"Men and Women of full age, without any limitation due to
race, nationality, or religion have the right to marry and to found a
family."-Article 16.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Miscegenation1 is a hydra-headed term. It can mean the mar-
riage between persons of different races, or the genetic crossing of
races, or the sexual relations of two persons of different races. Our
use of the term will refer generally to the first meaning-marriage
between members of different races-and our concern is whether
miscegenation laws, i.e., laws forbidding such marriages, are within
the states' powers as they are limited by the United States Constitu-
tion.
Presently, there are twenty-three states which have such laws
on their books.2 Our study will show that these statutes are not
based upon any scientific findings but that they are the result of
local prejudice.3 Yet there have been only two instances in which
appellate courts have held such laws to be unconstitutional. 4 The
first case was decided in 1872 by the Alabama Supreme Court. The
court found that the Alabama miscegenation statute and the accom-
panying statute which punished anyone solemnizing the marriage
of a white person and a Negro were both in violation of the spirit
of the Fourteenth Amendment which, in their opinion, demanded
that any "persons who acquire citizenship under it shall not be dis-
tinguished from the former citizens for any of the causes, or any of
the grounds, which previously characterized their want of citizen-
t Mr. Cummins is a senior student at the University of Denver College of Law. Mr. Kane is a recent
graduate of the Univerity of Denver College of Low.
1 We apologize for using such an ill-sounding word. Since our outlook on the matter is one
of liberality, we would prefer the term "interracial marriage". Unfortunately, the word "misceg-
enation" is handier sometimes and is the commonly used term in the low. We bow to tradition
for the sake of convenience.
2 See Appendix I.
3 Only seven of the states are not of what is generally considered the South, and only one,
Delaware, is of the Northeast. The statement is premature, but we intend to demonstrate it.
4 Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). Harry
Bridges, a labor leader, made the headlines of the country's press when he attempted to marry a
Nisei in Nevada. He was at first refused a license, but a state district court ordered the issuance
of the license stating, "[T]he right to marry is the right of the individual, not the race . . . If
we are to take the proposition that all men are born free and equal seriously, then we can't very
well ignore the implications." Time, Dec. 22, 1958, p. 17. A Maryland statute which made it a
crime for a white woman to bear a Negro's child was held unconstitutional in State v. Howard,




ship."'5 "It cannot be supposed that this discrimination was other-
wise than against the negro...."
The judicial climate in Alabama changed radically in 1877 when
the conviction of a party to a Negro-Caucasian marriage was upheld
and the former case expressly overruled. The court explained their
action by saying: "The natural law, which forbids their intermar-
riage and that amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races,
is as clearly divine as that which imparts to them different na-
tures. '7 Later in the same year another case reached the Alabama
Supreme Court concerning the conviction of a Negro and a Cau-
casian who had married in 1875 upon the assurance of a probate
judge that the Supreme Court of Alabama had decided that the law
forbidding such a marriage was null and void. He gave them a
license authorizing any justice of the peace to marry them. The
court upheld their conviction (and a sentence of at least two years
in the penitentiary) and declared that ignorance of the law was no
excuse.' The decision is rather amgibuous on the latter point since
it is not clear whether "ignorance of the law" applied to the de-
fendants or to the 1872 court. If the appellation applied to the de-
fendants then it is obvious that the court was in error. It was not
a case of the defendants being ignorant of the law, but of being cor-
rupted by the court's first decision which blinded them from per-
ceiving that "clearly divine" natural law.
In 1948 Davis Knight, age twenty-three, was sentenced to five
years imprisonment by a Mississippi court for marrying a white
girl. His only Negro ancestor was a great-grandmother whom nei-
ther he nor his parents had known about.9 By all anthropological
criteria this person was a Caucasian, but not so according to the
law of Mississippi. Unfortunately, the persons who have been con-
victed under these laws are either ignorant of their existence or
they have not the means or the opportunity to move to a state whose
laws do not make them criminals. Such laws may also have dis-
astrous side effects. The children may be illegitimate and disabled
from inheriting, 10 as well as the "spouse."" The right of a widow
5 Burns v. State, supro note 4, at 197.
6 Id. at 196.
7 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
8 Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877).
9 Time, Dec. 27, 1948, p. 18. The police were informed by a relative who, as the result of an
old family feud, dug up Knight's genealogy.
10 See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §42-328 (1943); Greenhow v. James' Ex'r, 80 Va. 636 (1885).
11 Steven v. United States, 146 F.2d 120 (20th Cir. 1944); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231
Pac. 483 (1924).
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to workmen's compensation may be denied.12 Even the minister who
performs such a marriage may suffer.' 3 If the couple are not prose-
cuted they still may be persecuted by the police until they leave the
state.
14
II. HISTORY OF MISCEGENATION
Laws prohibiting marriage between certain races are relatively
modern when viewed on the time scale of western civilization. Al-
though dominant nations have taken slaves and prohibited their citi-
zens from intermarrying with them ever since the time of ancient
Egypt and ancient Babylon, 15 different cultures have treated the
matter as one of legal and social status rather than as being biologi-
cally harmful. Early Roman law, for instance, prohibited marriages
between the Patrician class and the Plebeians. 16 Hellenic Greece
and the Roman Empire had a master-slave economy in which mar-
riage between the freeman and a slave was considered a social dis-
grace and it was usually prohibited. 17 The average freeman had
disdain for the slaves whether they were from Africa or Gaul.
18
The concept of race was undoubtedly first developed in Amer-
ica because of the institution of slavery which was largely confined
to a distinct African group whose physical appearance differed
greatly from the European settlers. To be sure, in pre-Columbian
history, man had always been identified as belonging to different
cultures, religions, distinct nationalities, and as having different
physical characteristics, "but strong as patriotism and national feel-
ing might be, they did not think of themselves in terms of ethnology,
and, in making war for every other sort of reason, never made it
for the sake of imposing their own type of civilization .... In none
of such cases did the thought of racial distinctions come to the
front."' 9
The first slaves were brought to the New World around 1510.
Historians have found that the slave commerce became so large that
the landowners in the West Indies and the American mainland could
no longer justify the barter and sale of human beings with the myth
that they were war captives and criminals. Public opinion in Amer-
ica and England began to grow against the slave trade as time went
on and there was increasing knowledge of the harsh conditions on
the plantations and the trip over from the African continent. South-
ern landowners found an answer to these objections in the theory
that Africans were subhuman and incapable of human feelings. The
same process can be seen in the settlement of Europeans in other
parts of the then expanding world. The intellectual concept of a
hierarchy of biological races grew and spread over the globe with
12 Rodriguez v. Utilities Eng'r & Constr. Co., 281 P.2d 946 (Okla. 1955).
13 See, e.g., Ark. Stats. Ann. 55-105 (1947).
14 For illustrations see Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law 347-48 (1959).
15 The Code of Hammurabi provided that the master of a female slave could take her as a
concubine, but "that concubine shall not rank with his wife." The Code of Hammurabi, sec. 145
(Harper transl. 1904).
16 This was changed in 445 B.C. Hunter, Roman Law 688 (3d ed. 1897).
17 Id. at 683. There were some restrictions on marrying aliens also. See Devis, S., Race Rela-
t'ons in Ancient Egypt 54 (1952).
18 Diller, Race Mixture Among the Greeks Before Alexandria (1937). Some had decided tastes,
however, in their choice of slaves. Cicero wrote to wealthy slave-owner friend Atticus: "Do not
obtain your slaves from Britain, because they are so stupid and so utterly incapable of being
taught that they are not fit to form part of the household of Athens." Quoted in Montagu, Man's
Most Dangerous Myth, 174 (3d ed. 1952).
19 Bryce, Race Sentiment as a Factor in History 26 (1925).
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the rise of colonization. It was an easy abstraction, because the in-
ferior social status of the Negro and his different features and color
and his illiteracy lent credence to the idea of his being a different
biological species whose mind and body were not human.
The institution of Negro slavery was engendered by the spread-
ing of colonialism. The attitude of the conqueror to the conquered
contributed to the efficacy of the institution because the conqueror
desired to maintain a stable society of essentially. imperialistic de-
sign. In Spanish-American colonies marriage between Spaniards
and Indians was at first forbidden, but as early as 1514 the ban was
lifted and such marriages were encouraged in hope that legitimate
unions would induce the Spanish to make permanent settlements in
the New World.
20
Neither the common law of England nor its statutory law pro-
hibited miscegenation. The earliest record we have of an English
colonial law barring racial amalgamation was in Jamestown in 1630.
In this instance it was ordered that a white man should be publicly
whipped before an assemblage of Negroes and whites "for abusing
himself to the dishonour of God and the shame of Christians by de-
filing his body in lying with a Negro."'21
Legal opposition against such relationships developed more
slowly in other colonies. The general custom and law of the time
gave a child the status of his mother, i.e., free or slave. Apparently
many of the immigrating English-women were marrying Negro
slaves due to the severe shortage of Negro women in the New World.
Thus the master lost the offspring of male slaves because they were
born into a freeman's status. In 1661 Maryland passed a law which
made such women slaves with their husbands, and made the chil-
dren of the marriage slaves also.22 This was not a miscegenation
statute since it did not outlaw the marriages, but it does reveal cer-
tain economic motives which presented themselves in that era's leg-
islation. According to some historians, 23 it became a practice of
plantation owners to encourage marriages between the lower classes
of Europeans and the slaves in order to gain more slaves by their
progeny. Lord Baltimore soon put a halt to such penalties when he
learned that some of the servant girls he had sent over were being
made slave women.24 In 1861 Maryland passed a statute placing a
penalty upon any master who would encourage a marriage between
a Negro slave and a European woman, but still the marriage was
recognized.25 Since the issue of such marriages were no longer slaves
because of Lord Baltimore's intervention, there was no interest on
20 Miscegenation 9 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 531.
21 Statutes at Large of Virginia, cited in Stonequist, Race Relations and Race Problems (Thompson
ed. 1939).
22 i An farasmuch as divers freeborn English women, forgetful of their free condition, and to
the disgrace of our notion [note that the word race has not yet been adopted] do intermarry with
negro slaves, by which also divers suits may arise, touching the issue of such women. and a great
damage cloth befall the master of such nearoes, for preservation whereof for detering such free-
born women from such shameful matches, be it enacted; That whatsoever free-born women shall
intermarry with any slave, from and after the last day of the present assembly, shall serve the
master of such slave during the life of her husband: and that all the issues of such free-born
women so married shall be slaves as their fathers were. And be it further enacted: That all issues
of English or other free-born women, that have already married negroes, shall serve the master
of their parents, till they be thirty years of age and no longer.
'  
Proceedings of the General
Assembly of Maryland, 1637-1664, pp. 533-534. Quoted in Woodson, Beginnings of Miscegenation
of Whites and Blacks, 3 Journal of Negro History 339 (1918).
23 Calhoun, I., A Social History of the American Family 325 (1917), and McCormac, White Servi-
tude in Maryland 68 (1904).




the part of the masters to encourage such unions. In fact, the Mu-
latto children became the burden of the master since they were the
legal children of his male slaves. When they reached a mature age
they were free to go. It became necssary to frame laws which com-
pelled the white servant girls to reimburse the master for the costs
of supporting their children.2 6 Eventually marriage between the
two races was prohibited and severe penalties were inflicted upon
women who had illegitimate children by a person of another race.2 7
Similar development took place in other colonies. In 1691 Vir-
ginia enacted a statute which declared that any white person who
married with a Negro, Mulatto or Indian "shall within three months
after such marriage be banished and removed from this dominion
forever.'2 Eventually miscegenation laws were passed in nearly all
the colonies and in the nineteenth century a total of thirty-eight
states had at one time or another some kind of prohibition of in-
terracial marriage. The laws were quite ineffective in preventing
interbreeding. 29 Illicit relations between the races were common
26 Id. at 70.
27 Dorsey, The General Public Statutory Law and Public Local Law of the State of Maryland,
from 1692-1839 at 79, cited in Woodson, op. cit. sup~ra note 22, at 349.
28 Ballagh, White Servitude in the Colony of Virginia 72-73 (1895).
29 The Pennsylvania miscegenation statute was passed in 1725; in 1780 the records of Chester
County showed that one-fifth of the Negro population was classified as Mulatto. By 1860 Mulattoes
constituted one-third of the Negro population of Pennsylvania. Statistics quoted by Woodson, op. cit.





occurrences in all the colonies.30 Mulattoes were rapidly becoming
a numerous element in the American population.
After the Civil War the northern states began to repeal their
miscegenation laws, but most southern states found it desirable to
make theirs more harsh. Southern vigilance against "contamina-
tion" reached its highest point in Georgia in 1927 and Virginia in
1930 when these states passed laws requiring all citizens to register
with the state and identify which "race" they belonged to. In both
states "a single drop of Negro blood" disqualified a person from
marrying a "white person".
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF MISCEGENATION LAWS
In 1932 there were thirty states which forbade interracial mar-
riages. In 1951 there were twenty-nine such states. Today there are
twenty-three. Six states have the restriction expressly stated in
their constitutions.31 All the statutes prohibit Negro-white mar-
riages, but some include other races such as Malayans, Mongolians,
American Indians, Hindus, Mestizos, Chinese, and Japanese. The
highest courts of only twelve states have ever decided the question
of the constitutionality of these laws. Only a California decision re-
mains on the books declaring such a law to be in contravention to
the Constitution.3 2 The United States Supreme Court has never
passed on the question although they have had opportunity to do
so.
3 3
Pace v. Alabama34 is sometimes cited as upholding the constitu-
tionality of laws prohibiting intermarriage between races. This case
dealt with the statutory punishment for fornication between a Cau-
casian and a Negro. The Court upheld the statute on the theory that
both races were equally treated although the punishment was great-
er for interracial relations than the punishment for the same act be-
tween two members of the same race. The reasoning in Shelley v.
Kraemer35 probably overrules Pace since that case holds that the
equal protection clause applies to individuals and not to races. Ad-
ditionally, Pace did not concern itself with the right to marry a per-
30 In the Louisiana territory it seems that concubinage of a white man and a Negro slave was
prohibited, but the practice was so common that a law was passed providing that if a man have
a child by such a slave and be not already married then she was to be a freewoman and remain
his wife. See Woodson, op. cit. supra note 22, at 338.
31 Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. See Appendix I.
32 Prez v. Lippold, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). Evidently Alabama had a "carpet-bag"
Supreme Court in 1872 when they declared their miscegenation law unconstitutional. Their decision
was later overruled in 1877. See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
33 In In re Monk's Estate, 48 Cal. App.2d 603, 120 P.2d 167 (1941) the Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal on the around that the record did not show that the appeal was applied for within the
time provided by law. 317 U.S. 590, rehearing denied 317 U.S. 711 (1942). The Court denied
certiorari of Jackson v. State, 37 Ala. App. 519, 72 So.2d 114 (1954) in 348 U.S. 888 (1954). In
Naim v. Naim, 297 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955) the Court upon appeal remanded to state court,
350 U.S. 891, for further findings of fact. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to send
the case down to the trial court because they had no procedural rules by which they would remand
a case after the court's decree affirming the judgment became final. 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849
(1956). The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from this action on the ground that no
federal question remained. 350 U.S. 985 (1956). This seems incorrect. The state court's action was
in direct conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court's order that "the judgment of the said Supreme
Court of Appeals in this cause be, and the same is hereby, vacated." (The order is quoted in 90
S.E.2d at 849.)
34 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
35 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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son of one's choice, but was limited to the question of inequality of
punishment for fornication which is admittedly within the state's
power to proscribe.
There are a few lower federal court decisions upholding state
miscegenation laws.36 The rationale of the decisions of state courts
upholding these laws can be grouped into three main theses:
37 (1)
that miscegenation is against the law of Nature, God, etc.3 8; (2) there
is no race discrimination because the statute applies to both races
equally 39 (no court has said all races are treated equally since nearly
every statute leaves out one or more of the commonly accepted races
36 In r* Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 262 (No. 6,550) (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1871) upholding a Georgia statute;
Ex parte Kinney, 14 Fed. Cos. 602 (No. 7,825) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) upholding a Virginia statute;
Ex parte Francois, 9 Fed. Cas. 699 (No. 5,047) (C.C.W.D. Texas) upholding a Texas statute; State
v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1890) upholding a Georgia statute; Stevens v. United States,
146 F.2d 220 (10th Cir. 1944) upholding an Oklahoma statute.
37 All the latest decisions are grouped in the next three footnotes. Other state supreme courts
have reviewed miscegenation statutes but did not expressly rule on the question of constitutionality.
Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So.2d 140 (1948); In re Takahashi's Estate, 113 Mont. 490, 129
P.2d 217 (1942); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1887); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483
(1924) were cases where the constitutionality was not questioned by the appellant. In State v.
Brown, 236 La. 562, 108 So.2d 233 (1959) the statute prohibited both cohabitation and marriage of
Negroes and Caucasians. The defendants were charged with cohabitation, but the court in dictum
discussed the constitutionality of the marriage clause.
38 "And surely there can not be any tyranny or injustice in requiring both alike, to form this
union with those of their own race only, whom God hath joined together by indelible peculiarities,
which declare that He has made the two races distinct." Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877).
" . it is not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to suffer men to
follow the low of races established by the Creator himself, and not to compel them to intermix
contrary to their instincts." State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (1871).
39 Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942); Scott v. State,
39 Ga. 321 (1869); In re Paquet's Estate, 101 Ore. 393, 200 Pac. 911 (1921); Naim v. Naim, 197
Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955).
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of mankind); and (3) discrimination because of race or not, racial
purity is a legitimate object of the state police power.
40
In the California case of Perez v. Lippold41 the court, in a four-
to-three decision striking down the California statute, gave an ex-
cellent discussion of the question. Since the statute denied a person
a privilege merely because of race, it could be upheld only if it were
directed at some social or biological evil. The court examined the
findings of scientists and could find no such evil. Therefore, there
was a denial of equal protection. Also, the statute was thought to be
too indefinite since it failed to define the method of ascertaining to
which race a given individual of mixed blood belonged.
Although there has been a great amount of interbreeding be-
tween Caucasians and Negroes in this country, most of it occurred
before this century as the result of illicit relationships. Today in-
terracial marriage is probably distasteful to the vast majority of
both Negroes and Caucasians. However, there are still those few
people who are unjustly convicted for merely marrying a person of
their own choice, sometimes knowing they are of two different races
and occasionally oblivious to the fact.42 Two sections of the Con-
stitution suggest that these convictions and rulings are unconstitu-
tional.
A. Full Faith and Credit Clause
43
Although many states have recognized, either by statute or case
law, the validity of marriages that were valid where contracted, al-
though contrary to miscegenation laws of the forum, there are at
least seven states which do not. 44 If the couple leave the forum in
order to evade the marriage laws and then return, it has been re-
peatedly held that the forum is under no duty to recognize the mar-
riage. 45 The general rule that a marriage is valid everywhere if
valid where made has at least three exceptions: polygamous mar-
riages, incestuous marriages, and those marriages so opposed to state
public policy that the court should not recognize them. It has been
suggested that miscegenetic marriages come within the last excep-
tion.
46
The fact that there are many miscegenation laws which vary so
widely as to what is prohibited under the term "miscegenation" is
strong evidence that the right of certain married couples in other
states to move freely throughout the Union is severly threatened.
The right to move freely throughout the states is a right guaranteed
40 State v. Pass, 61 Ark. 57, 121 P.2d 882 (1942); Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S.W. 977
(1895); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871); Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877) reaffirmed in
Francois v. State. 9 Tex. 144 (1880). In State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883), the court gave
this reason: "It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of a black man and a white
woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny,
and such a fact sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and
whites, laying out of view other sufficient grounds for such enactments." This "fact" is complete
fiction. See Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth 128 (1948) for a discussion of the findings of
geneticists.
41 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (sometimes cited as Perez v. Sharp).
42 See note 9 supra where defendant was held to be a Negro even though he and his family
had always assumed they were Caucasians.
43 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and iudicidl
Proceedings of every other State." Art. IV, § 1, U.S. Constitution.
44 Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Some of these states
recognize such marriages if the parties never moved to the forum end the only issu. is whether
the marriage is valid far purposes of intestacy. See Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824, 36 So.2d 140
(1948); Caballero v. Executor, 24 La. App. 573 (1872).
45 See cases annotated in 3 A.L.R.2d 240 (1949).
46 State v. Bell, 7 Tenn. 9 (1872).
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to citizens of the several states under Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution. 47 Additionally, it is a privilege of citizens of the na-
tional government as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment.
48
It would seem that the restrictions imposed by miscegenation laws
are unconstitutional if they attempt to control the marital status of
couples married outside the jurisdiction.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
Invariably it has been the Equal Protection Clause49 in the
Fourteenth Amendment which the courts have relied on to declare
that laws which discriminate according to race are unconstitutional.
In the Slaughter House Cases50 the Equal Protection Clause was
narrowly construed by the Court's prediction that it would only be
applicable to situations where legislation was unfair to the Negro
race. Although the Equal Protection Clause has subsequently ex-
panded to nullify all kinds of unreasonable discrimination, the
Court's decision is valuable in that it illustrates the historical neces-
sity for the Fourteenth Amendment. It was enacted primarily to
take care of the Negro's powerless position in the South.51
At first glance one might construe the provision "nor shall any
State . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws" to mean that an individual is entitled merely to
equal procedural facilities in the courts. Clearly this would not be
a substantial amendment to the Constitution since unequal substan-
tive law could be used as a weapon by racial supremacists to cir-
cumvent the principle of equality. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Mr. Jus-
tice Matthews set the matter straight by declaring that "The equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
'52
Equality was demanded in all public law and in the administration
of the law.
There was no indication by the Supreme Court that there could
be absolutely no legislation which treated special groups in a special
manner. In the Slaughter House Cases the Court denied any in-
ference that the Privileges and Immunities Clause meant that a
status quo in all public law at the time of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment must be maintained, as it was necessary that they recognize
the states' power to enact laws which might burden one class of citi-
zens rather than all.53 The only requirements were that the purpose
of the law be within the proper scope of what has been recognized
as the police power and that the classification set up by the law to
bring about the desired objective be reasonably related to the end
desired. This is often interpreted by the courts to require that those
similarly situated be similarly treated.54 It is not enough that the
persons affected by the law have those characteristics which iden-
47 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 547 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1823).
48 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
49 " . .. N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. Constitution, Art. XIV, § 1.
5083 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
51 For a history of this amendment see tenBroeck, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, (1951).
52 128 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
53 "Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits .... Regulations for these purposes
may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to
impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon anyone, but to promote, with as little individual
inconvenience as possible, the general good." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
54 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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tify them as belonging to a certain class-and thus be treated as
those similarly situated-but they must also possess those character-
istics which are subject to state regulation under the police power.
Logically, it would also mean that those who do not possess the mis-
chievous characteristics should not be included within the defined
class. This is not always possible and so the courts have compro-
mised and asked that the classification be as reasonable as possible
under the circumstances. Thus there may be many intelligent peo-
ple under the age of twenty-one who are mature enough to vote, and
yet it is reasonable that the class of persons under that age be pre-
cluded. It would be too burdensome, too "unreasonable" to require
that the state separate minors into "mature" and "immature" classes
by giving them a battery of tests.
The presumption of constitutionality generally applies to laws
which are attacked as being a denial of equal protection. 55 This pre-
sumption is not indulged in when a racial classification is set up by
a state law. On the contrary, it appears that the presumption is that
the statute is invalid. At least the Court has stated that such classi-
fication is "constitutionally suspect."56 Racial classification has been
struck down in school segregation laws,57 public recreational facili-
ties,58 and transportation.
59
In summary, the Equal Protection Clause demands these re-
quirements for discriminatory legislation: (1) the classification as
set up by the statute must be reasonably related to bring about the
ends desired, (2) the ends desired must be within the proper scope
of the state police power, and (3) the state has the burden of show-
ing the reasonableness of using race as a classification.
C. Reasonable Classification
There is perhaps one exception to the requirement of reasonable
classification. Where a law aims at a particular evil but hits only
one particular group of persons, and by its own terms does not cover
all persons having the same anti-social characteristics, the law may
55 Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904); Keokee Consolidated Coke Co.
v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
50 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). And see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) and Hiirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (dictum in both cases).
57 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
58 Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955), affirming 220 F.2d 386
(1955).
59 Goyle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming 142 F. Supp. 707 (1956).
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be said to be "under-inclusive."" ° It would seem that such classifica-
tion is not equal protection by the law; but the courts may, never-
theless, uphold the statute on the theory that since no innocent peo-
ple will be affected by it, the fact that some socially harmful per-
sons will be left untouched by the statute will not be a reason for
the courts to strike it down. Mr. Justice Holmes was perhaps the
first to articulate this rule of constitutional law in a case where the
Court upheld a Texas statute which prohibited railroads from allow-
ing certain types of noxious grass to go to seed on their right-of-
way.61 As to the argument that other property owners were not
subject to the law, Holmes responded, "It would have been more
obviously fair to extend the regulation at least to highways," but
"When a state legislature has declared that in its opinion policy re-
quires a certain measure, its action should not be disturbed by the
courts under the Fourteenth Amendment, unless they can see clear-
ly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require
with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched.
'62
Thus even this doctrine of "under-inclusiveness" has its breaking
point. Where there is no fair reason for excluding a class of persons
who should by common sense be included then the court will find
the classification to be purely arbitrary and thus unreasonable.
Two cases which have been decided by the Supreme Court
which do not involve miscegenation (but which have a bearing on
the problem as we shall later point out) illustrate the "breaking
point." In Buck v. Bell6 3 the Court upheld a statute which provided
for sterilization of feeble-minded patients at the state mental hos-
pital. The statute provided for a special hearing where evidence as
to the nature of the patient's disease is presented by the state and
opportunity for the patient's guardian to rebut the allegation that
there is a danger that the condition could be transmitted to the fu-
ture offspring of the patient. As to the argument that many heredi-
tarily feeble-minded persons would escape the purview of the law
because they are in private institutions or cared for at home, Mr.
Justice Holmes, again speaking for the Court, responded, "But the
answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does all that
it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks
to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as
its means allow.
64
In a later case, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 5 the Court decided that
the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was a denial of
equal protection. The statute condemned to sterilization all crim-
inals who has been convicted two or more times on felony charges
involving moral turpitude, for the purpose of preventing the trans-
mission of inheritable criminal tendencies to future generations. For
some reason the legislature excepted from the definition of a felony
"those offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws,
revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses." The Court found
the exception for embezzlers to be highly arbitrary, that there was
60 See Tussman and tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, for an
excellent analysis of this type of law and the Equal Protection Clause in general.
61 Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904),
62 Id. at 269.
63 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
64 Id. at 208.
65 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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no fair reason why embezzlers should not be included. "We have
not the slightest basis for inferring that that line of distinction [be-
tween larceny and embezzlement] has any significance in eugenics
nor that the inheritability of criminal traits follows that neat legal
distinction which the law has marked between those two offenses." 66
It would seem that the same reasoning would have resulted if
the Oklahoma statute, instead of classifying all felonies and then
making an exception for embezzlement, had merely stated separate-
ly all possible felony crimes and then left out of the list the crime of
embezzlement. The exception would still be there, but not explicit-
ly, and the Court could have argued that it was purely arbitrary
that embezzlers were left out and that, therefore, the whole statute
was invalid.
The usual type of miscegenation law prohibits marriage be-
tween a member of the Negro race and a member of the Caucasian
race (usually called "white people" in the statute). A few of the
laws mention "Orientals," "Mongolians," and an even smaller num-
ber mention Indians and Malayans. Racial classification depends
largely upon which anthropological textbook one reads. Some an-
thropologists classify man into five races: Black, White, Yellow,
Red, and Brown. Others give only three race stocks: black or Ne-
groid, white or Caucasoid, and yellow (or yellow-brown) or Mon-
goloid.6 7 If we take the latter as the simplest classification, then we
find that only five miscegenation laws mention all three races.68 It
is doubtful that the term "Mongolian" includes the American Indian
to the average person or even to the courts, 69 although it does to
anthropologists who follow the three-race classification. However,
if we assume that it does have that meaning in the law, then there
are still eighteen miscegenation laws which have failed to cover all
the situations where racial purity could be endangered. It is just as
arbitrary to exclude certain races from the terms of the statutes as
it was in the Skinner case to exclude "embezzlers." Assuming that
miscegenation is biologically dangerous to future generations as the
proponents of these laws claim, then upon what reasonable grounds
can it be said that one or more races can be excepted from the terms
of the miscegenation law? It is just as easy to mention the Indians
and the Orientals as it is to mention the Negroes and Caucasians.
Perhaps the defenders of the statutes would argue that in these
states there is no problem as to members of those two races because
there are very few persons of those races within the states. But the
Court in the Skinner case did not rest its decision on the fact that
there were a large group of embezzlers in Oklahoma, but because,
categorically, there was no fair reason to include people convicted
66 Id. at 542.
67 Kroeber, Anthropology 141 (1948) gives a history of race classifications.
68 Mississippi, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Missouri. Arizona's use of the term "Mongolian"
probably does not 'include Indians since the statute originally included that term specifically, but
was dropped in 1942. If we take the five-race (or even a four-race) clossification, then none of
the statutes could be said to mention them all.
69 In U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), the Court in interpreting a naturalization
law declared a high caste Hindu of full Asiatic Indian blood not to be a "white person" as far
as naturalization was concerned. "What we now hold is that the words 'free white persons' are
words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the understanding of. the common
man, synonymous with the word 'Caucasian' only as that word is popularly understood. As so
understood and used, whatever may be the speculations of the ethnologist, it does not include the
body of people to whom the appellee belongs." at 214-215.
DICTA
JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1961
of larceny but exclude persons convicted of embezzlement. Besides,
the statistics do not uphold the argument except in the deep South.
7 0
This seems to be a classification which is unfair and is aimed at
only two particular races-the Orientals in some of the states and
the Negroes in all the states which have these miscegenation laws.
When classification is concerned with fundamental rights such as
the right to marry and have children, shouldn't the courts be very
strict in the definition of "reasonable classification"? This was ex-
actly the situation in the Skinner case, dealing with sterilization of
felons. The Court said, "We are dealing here with legislation which
involves one of the most basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the [human] race."
'71
In matters of tax law and property law, the doctrine of "under-
inclusiveness" may save a statute from being declared unconstitu-
tional, but when the doctrine involves a pseudo-scientific statute
based on the assumption of inheritance of bad genetic combinations,
the Court is very careful to protect individual rights and it will re-
quire the legislation to treat equally all those who are similarly
situated. It will not do to arbitrarily leave out certain races of men.
"When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed
intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not
the other, it has made an invidious discrimination as if it had se-
lected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment. 7 2
As we shall discuss later, there are many decisions which state that
any racial classification is immediately suspect; in fact, since the
Segregation Cases,7'3 which overruled the "separate but equal doc-
trine," there no longer remain any Supreme Court decisions which
uphold classification based on race in any state laws. Aided by this
70 A few examples: Arizona places no restrictions on Indian-Caucasian marriages, but does on
Negro-Caucasian marriages, and yet there are over twice as many Indians as Negroes in the state.
The same is true of Utah, unless the word "Mongolian" includes Indians. Oklahoma forbids only
Negro-Caucasian marriages and yet there are about 55,000 people who belong to other races. In
contrast, Nebraska forbids Oriental-Caucasian marriages and the Orientals compose no more than
00.075% of the population. (Statistics compiled from the 1950 census, World Almanac 1960.)
71 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1952).
72 Ibid.
73 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 597 (1954).
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overwhelming presumption of invalidity of race-type statutes it can
be fairly predicted that statutes which prohibit only some types of
interracial marriage but exclude others would be declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court.
There is another defect in these statutes-in fact in all the mis-
cegenation statutes. Even if they forbid intermarriage between a
Negro and a Caucasian and between a Mongolian and a Caucasian,
they fail to prohibit marriages between Mongolians and Negroes.
If racial interbreeding is dangerous to racial purity, then why are
members of the Caucasian race the only ones protected? The an-
swer is, of course, that when the law-makers think of racial purity
they think only of their own race and by doing this they have re-
vealed the true source of these laws-bigotry.7 4 Certainly a Negro
or an Oriental could claim that he was being denied equal protec-
tion of the law.
75
Let us suppose, however, that a statute names the three (or
four, or five) races of man and then proceeds to bar intermarriage
between any of these races. It might seem that this would circum-
vent the Equal Protection Clause. Such a statute, we submit, is still
unconstitutional for several reasons.
There is a large class of people who are not of pure racial stock.
Estimates of anthropologists and sociologists as to the number of
Negroes having ascertainable Caucasian "blood" vary from one-
third of the Negro population to as high as three-fourths.7 6 Just
how are these people to be classified? All the statutes unfairly dis-
criminate against "Negroes" and "Mulattoes" because when they de-
fine those terms they may provide that a Negro or Mulatto is any-
one with one-eighth 77 Negro blood or any trace of Negro blood.78
Some states do not define the terms. 79 Here again prejudice is seen
74 One Georgia Supreme Court Justice made a revealing remark in a decision which upheld
their miscegenation statute. After declaring that the law was not a denial of equal protection
because it sought to keep both races pure from unnatural offspring that were inferior to both, he
went on and refuted his own rationalization by declaring, "It is sometimes urged that such mar-
riages should be encouraged, for the purpose of elevating the inferior race. The reply is, that such
connections never elevate the inferior race to the position of the superior, but they bring down
the superior to that of the inferior. They are productive of evil, and evil only ... .... Scott
v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869). Does not the court admit that the low was designed to protect
the "superior" white race only?
A more recent exomole is to be found in State v. Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882, 884 (1942)
where the court explained, "The evident purpose of the miscegenation statute was to prevent the
named races, to wit, Indians, Negroes, etc. from mixing their blood with the blood of the white
man and such purpose is lawful." 121 P.2d at 884.
75 North Carolina has a law (See Appendix I) which clearly violates the idea of equality before
the low: Negroes are prohibited from marrying Cherokee Indians of Robeson County, but no other
Indians. For the interesting story behind this law that dates back to the early 16th century, see
Stephenson, G. T., Race Distinctions in American Law 90-91 (1910). In Arizona the legislature went
so for as to define a MWjatto in such terms that he could not marry anyone. This was pointed
out by the court in State v Pass, 59 Ariz. 16, 121 P.2d 882 (1942) and that year the legislature
changed the law by dropping the prohibition against interracial marriage with Indians. As it
stands now, a Mulatto in Arizona can marry an Indian; but if he should marry a Negro. a Caucasian,
or another Mulatto, he would be violating the law. For the change in the law see Arizona Laws
1942, 1st S.S., ch. 12, § 1.
76Reuter, The American Race Problem 58-60, 126-133 (1927), and Herskovitz, The American
Negro 60-62 (1928).
77 Ten states. Some of these provide that anyone of Negro descent to the third generation is
a Negro. See, Appendix I.
78 Four states. See Appendix I.
79 Nine states. See Appendix I Proof of race in state courts is a many splendored thing.
Missouri has provided by statute the method of putting the individual on the stand and letting
the jury decide his race from his appearance. Mo. Ann. Stat. (1953) § 56.3.240 The fact that
the individual associates with Negroes may make him one in North Carolina. Hopkins v. Bowers,
111 N.C. 175, 16 S.E. 1 (1892). In Texas the fact that a woman "looks like a white woman" has
been held insufficient evidence to prove it. Moore v. State, 7 Tex. App. 608 (1880). In one case
a Filipino had to appeal to the California Court of Appeals to find out whether he was a Mon-
golian. It was decided he was a Malayan and not a fiongolian. Rolidan v. Los Angeles County,
129 Col. App. 267, 18 P 2d 706 (1933).
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to be the basis of miscegenation laws and such laws are unreason-
able and arbitrary in their classification. If racial purity is the goal
of these laws then why do they allow a "pure Negro" to marry a
person who is seven-eights Caucasian and only one-eighth Negro?
D. Is Racial Purity a Proper Objective of State Laws?
Even if the statute confined marriages of "pure Negroes" to
"'pure Negroes" and marriages of "pure Caucasians" to "pure Cau-
casians," etc. and provided that all persons of mixed bloods could
marry only among themselves, a very paradoxical result would
arise. By strictly confining members of pure races to themselves,
there is created a new race-the Hybrids. If pure Negroes and pure
Caucasians are forbidden to intermarry on the theory that it will
produce an inferior offspring, then we have a clear case of racial
prejudice being the sole motivation of the law. For, if the Hybrids
are now classified as a race unto themselves, then a legislature is
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to pass a law which is
aimed at that particular race on the theory that it is inferior to
other races.
The words of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is true are
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored
race-the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation
against them distinctively as colored-exemptions implying
inferiority in civil society... and discriminations which are
steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race.8 0
When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated,
and it is further shown that the laws, as written or as ap-
plied, single out that class for different treatment not based
on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the
Constitution have been violated. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a
"two-class theory"-that is, based upon differences between
"white" and "Negro."81
Offspring of these marriages are being discriminated against be-
cause cf their race before they are even born. It is no answer to say
that this is excusable because unborn children have no rights and
do not constitute a race. The truth of the matter is that there are
at least four million Mulattoes in the United States today and our
hypothetical statute implies that they are a biologically inferior race
of people 82 The children of a Caucasian and a Negro are genetically
of the same "mixture" as the children of two true Mulattoes and yet
the begetting of children of the first couple is prohibited by law.
This is a clear case of a statute being founded on a belief of race
.superiority.
That this whole discussion may seem over-mathematical shows
that the 'raditional conception of race is based on the false illusion
80 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879).
,1 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S 475, 478 (1954).
82 "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hiraboyashi v.
United States, 320 U.S 81, 100 (1943).
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of the existence of pure genetic stocks. Many people cannot be
classified into the so-called race "types." They may not even be
Mulattoes, or quadroons, or octoroons. There are some people who
have Caucasian, Negro, and Indian ancestry. There are some peo-
ple in this country who were born in Hawaii who may have Poly-
nesian, Caucasian, Japanese, and Filipino forefathers. Many people
do not know to which "race" their forefathers belonged. Indeed,
very few of us have records of genealogical history that go further
back than a few generations. It is submitted that no law can be
designed which can apply equally to individuals similarly situated
and at the same time satisfy the theory that nonamalgamation of
races is best for all people. If we could start mankind over again,
the racists' arguments might be valid. As it is now, everyone is but
a conglomeration of many antique races 8 3 and the Negro and Cau-
casian races have already interbred to a high degree since the first
slaves were brought to this country.
8 4
Some courts have upheld miscegenation laws on the theory that
they promote public morality 5 and health.8 6 It can hardly be said
that miscegenation is immoral without implying that one of the
races is inferior to another. This so-called morality is the same mo-
tive behind the school segregation laws which the Supreme Court
has struck down. It is the same excuse which has been made for
every discriminatory legislation against Negroes and other minority
groups. To allow miscegenation laws to stand on such a claim would
be conceding that laws can be passed which primarily result in.
nothing but keeping alive racial prejudice. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment "was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetu-
ate discrimination on the basis of race or color. '8 7
As to the argument that these laws are within the police power
to promote and preserve the health of the people, there is no evi-
dence that members of different races are somehow allergics s to one.
another or that their offspring will be physically inferior. We will
83 "With respect to race-mixture, the evidence points unequivocally to the fact that this has
been going on from the earliest times. Indeed, one of the chief processes of race formation and
r-ce extinction or absorption is by means of hybridization between races or ethnic groups. Further-
more, no convincing evidence has been adduced that race mixture of itself produces biologically bad
effects ... " Statement on Race, UNESCO, statement 13, drawn up by a committee of the world's
outstanding scientists on the subject.
84 See in general, Reuter, The Mulatto in the United States (1918)
85 "The purity of public morals, the moral and physical development of both races . . . require
that they should be kept distinct and separate .... " Kinney v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. 858, 869 (1878).
86 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); Blake v. Sessions, 99 Okla. 59, 220 Pac. 876 (1923).
97 Railway Moil Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1944).
88 For a discussion of alleged allergies see Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth 237-241 (3d
ed. 1952).
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later review the authorities on this matter. As a consensus we can
take the following statement made by a committee of prominent
geneticists, psychologists, anthropologists, and medical doctors for
UNESCO:
Furthermore, no convincing evidence has been adduced
that race mixture of itself produces biologically bad effects.
Statements that human hybrids frequently show undesir-
able traits, both physically and mentally, physical dis-
harmonies and mental degeneracies, are not supported by
the facts. There is, therefore, no biological justification for
prohibiting intermarriage between persons of different
ethnic groups.8 9
In many instances miscegenation laws actually promote greater
hybridization of genetic stock since anyone who has enough Negroid
characteristics to be considered a Mulatto cannot marry a white per-
son even though he may be seven-eights Caucasian. As Mr. Justice
Jackson remarked, "There are limits to the extent to which a legis-
latively represented majority may conduct biological experiments
at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers
of a minority."90
E. The Presumption Against Racial Classification
There is another and even stronger argument against miscegen-
ation laws which is also based on the Equal Protection Clause. The
Supreme Court has stated that classifications based solely on race
are "constitutionally suspect."91 Indeed, there are many cases in
which the Court struck down a statute because on its face it set up
a racial classification. 92 After Brown v. Board of Education93 re-
moved the "separate but equal"' doctrine from constitutional law,
every former decision by the Supreme Court which upheld classi-
fication by race in a state law has been impliedly overruled.9 4 This
is so because Brown v. Board of Education has been the case on
which the Court later relied in striking down segregated public
facilities in fields outside of education.95
There are only two cases which could be said to remain as good
precedent for racial classification and both of them deal with fed-
eral power as opposed to state power. Both cases demonstrate that
racial classification is constitutionally suspect since the Court ex-
cused the decisions on the ground that the federal war power was
involved and should not be interfered with by the courts unless the
abuse is clear and without good reason. In Hirabayashi v. United
States8 a special curfew order that was issued soon after World
89 Statement on Race, UNESCO, statement 13.
90 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) concurring opinion at 546.
91 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See aIso Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)(dictum in both cases).
92 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (municipal ordinance); McCabe v. Atchison
T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
93 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
94 A possible exception might be Pace v. Alabama, supra note 34.
95 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), reversed and remanded
in light of the Segregation Cases, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Lonesome v. Maxwell, 220 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1955) off'd per curiam sub nom. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955);
Detiege v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958), off'd 358 U.S.
54 (1958); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), voc'g 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955). These
cases all dealt with public recreational facilities. As for transportation (intrastate) see Browder v.
Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ("we think that Plessy v.
Ferguson has been impliedly, though not explicitly overruled," 142 F.Supp. at 717).
96 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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War II broke out applied only to Japanese on the west coast. The
Court upheld the order and pointed out that the danger of espionage
and sabotage to our military resources was imminent and that the
curfew order was an appropriate measure to meet it. The Court
declared:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their an-
cestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equali-
ty. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimina-
tion based on race alone has been held to be a denial of
equal protection .... We may assume that these considera-
tions would be controlling here were it not for the fact that
the danger of espionage and sabotage in time of war and of
threatened invasion, calls upon the military authorities to
scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of
populations in the danger areas.
9 7
The other case also dealt with Japanese during the war. In
Korematsu v. United States98 the Court upheld by a six-to-three de-
cision an executive order for the evacuation of all Japanese from
the west coast for the purpose of removing any danger of espionage
and sabotage. The Court said:
It should be noted to begin with that all legal restric-
tions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that the courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing pub-
lic necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.99
The Court then explained why it thought that this was not racial
antagonism:
Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a
case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a con-
centration camp because of racial prejudice .... Korematsu
was not excluded from the Military Area because of hos-
tility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are
at war with the Japanese Empire.100
Thus the Court is demanding a pure motive on the part of the fed-
eral authorities. Although it is questionable whether the War De-
partment's motive was pure, i.e., whether it was exercised without:
some influence of racial prejudice, 10 1 it must be remembered that
the Court has always been reluctant to censor military orders in
time of war. From the above statements taken from the two cases:
it would appear that not even Congress could pass a miscegenation
law for the District of Columbia or a territorial possession unless it
could be shown that it was enacted free of racial antagonism and'
there was a pressing public necessity for such a law.
1 2
It would seem from all the foregoing that there is a strong pre-
sumption that any statute which sets up race as a classification is
97 Id. at 100.
98 323 U.S. 214 (194).
99 Id. at 216.
100 Id, at 223.
101 See footnotes in 323 U.S. on pp. 236, 237, 241 in the dissenting opinion.
102 Where racial classification in federal law was held a denial of due process, see Hurd v-
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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unconstitutional. A case in point is Oyama v. California where the
Court was confronted with a California statute that raised a pre-
sumption of violation of an alien land law (i.e., ineligible aliens were
forbidden to own land) when the consideration was paid by an in-
eligible alien for a transfer of land to a citizen or eligible alien. The
appellant was an American citizen whose father was a Japanese
citizen not eligible for naturalization. The father paid for land
transferred to the son and the trial court held that since the pre-
sumption had not been overcome by Oyama his land escheated. The
United States Supreme Court ruled that Oyama was denied equal
protection of the law because the statutory presumption applied to
him only because of his racial descent: 
1 0 3
There remains the question of whether discrimination
between citizens on the basis of their racial descent, as re-
vealed in this case, is justifiable. Here we start with the
proposition that only the most exceptional circumstances
can excuse discrimination on that basis in the face of the
equal protection clause and a federal statute giving all
citizens the right to own land .... [A] ssuming, for the pur-
pose of argument only, that the basic prohibition is consti-
tutional, it does not follow that there is no constitutional
limit to the means which may be used to enforce it. In the
light most favorable to the State, this case presents a con-
flict between the State's right to formulate a policy of land-
holding within its bounds and the right of American citi-
zens to own land anywhere in the United States. When
these two rights clash, the rights of a citizen may not be
subordinated merely because of his father's country of
origin.
104
Whether this means that the burden of showing the reasonable-
ness of racial classification is on the state is not entirely clear, but
103 The Court speaks of "race" at one point and "country of origin" at another. It is not clear
which the Court regarded as denying the appellant equal protection. The terms are of course not
synonymous. That one of the two concepts was the defect in the statute is clear, though. The
decision was not based on the theory that the presumption was a denial of due process in that
it was arbitrary, because it distinguished this case from Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925),
in which the same presumption was upheld against a non-descendant of the ineligible alien who
paid the consideration.
104 332 U.S. 633, 646-7 (1948).
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in Bolling v. Sharpe, in which the Court reviewed a school segrega-
tion law in the District of Columbia, it said, "Classification based
solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally sus-
pect."'10 5 The statute was held unconstitutional even though there
was no evidence submitted by the complainant that the statute was
unreasonable. The decision was based on the reasoning in Brown v.
Board of Education'0 6 which was decided the same day and in which
the Court apparently took judicial notice of the findings of psy-
chologists and sociologists. After the Court stated that separate
facilities in schools have a tendency to inculcate feelings of inferi-
ority in the Negro child which in turn affect his motivation to learn,
it added, "this finding is amply supported by modern authority" and
then cited in a footnote psychological and sociological studies. It is
significant that the Court applied this finding (that separate facili-
ties are inherently unequal) to all four of the cases that were de-
cided under the title Brown v. Board of Education even though only
two of the lower courts so found as a fact.
07
Another argument that the presumption is against the validity
of a statute which uses race as a criterion is the number of holdings
that have struck down laws which are innocent on their face but
discriminatory in their application. In Patton v. Mississippi10 8 a
Negro had been convicted by an all white jury. The Court received
evidence that there was a large percentage of the local population
that was Negro but that no Negroes had ever been called for jury
duty. The state court had shown that one must be a qualified voter
before he can be called for jury service, and that only one out of
400 voters was a Negro, even though one out of three citizens was a
Negro. The trial judge's rationalization was that the jury commis-
sioner was not discriminating against Negroes, but rather that Ne-
groes did not have the proper qualifications as determined by elec-
tion laws. The Court rejected this argument and held that the
statistics for the past thirty years had made a prima facie case of
racial discrimination. "But whatever the precise number of quali-
fied colored electors in the county there were some; and if it can
possibly be conceived that all of them were disqualified for jury
service by reason of the commission of crime, habitual drunkenness,
gambling, inability to read and write or to meet any other or all of
the statutory tests, we do not doubt that the state could have proved
it."10 9 Thus the presumption is that any law is a denial of equal pro-
tection which in its application treats people differently because of
their race. The burden is upon the state to show that the law as
applied is necessary to promote the health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare of the community. Other cases have held that a prima
105 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
106 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107 For the view that the finding was not a "finding of a fact" in the traditional sense but what
may be called a "legislative" one, such as courts always must make in assessing general social or
economic conditions as a basis of constitutional low decision, see Greenberg, Social Scientists Take
the Stand - A Review and Appraisal of Their Testimony in Litigation, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (1956).
108 332 U.S. 463 (1948).
109 Id. at 468.
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facie case has been made when circumstances similar to those in the
Patton case were shown.110
If the burden is upon the state to show the reasonableness (or
somehow explain the prima facie case) of racial classification in the
application of a statute, then it would seem that a fortiori there is a
prima facie case of discrimination when the statute on its face treats
one person differently than another solely because of his race. In-
deed, most such statutes have been held unconstitutional without
even discussing the possibility that the state could come forward
with evidence to explain the reasonableness of such a classifica-
tion."' Is not a miscegenation law "a statute which on its face
treats one person differently than another solely because of his
race"? Suppose that A, a white male, and B, a Negro male, both
wish to marry Z, a Negro female. The law allows B to marry her
and will protect him in all those rights that accompany marriage,
but A is not given that protection. A is denied equal protection
merely because of his race.
This seems simple enough, but it is surprising to see how many
courts avoid this fact by asserting that since each race is similarly
treated, the statute gives them equal protection. It is easy to argue
in such terms until one is reminded that races do not marry, only
individuals marry, and that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
individuals, not to racial groups.112 Thus in Shelley v. Kraemer'13
the Court, in response to the argument that restrictive covenants
could be enforced against the whites as well as against the Negroes,
declared, "The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The
rights established are personal rights. It is, therefore, no answer to
these petitioners to say that the courts may also be induced to deny
white persons rights of ownership and occupancy on grounds of
race or color. 11 4 The Court dealt with the right of an individual to
own and occupy property. This was considered a matter of individ-
ual choice. The Court held that a person cannot be denied this
choice merely because white neighbors object. The same has been
held as to the right to follow a chosen trade. 115 So it should be held
with marriage. Marriage has been regarded by the Court as one of
the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 It is true
that reasonable regulation of marriage has always been recognized
as within the police power of the state."7 State law can prohibit
what the legislature regards as incestuous marriages and can limit
the choice to individuals who are above a certain age and mentally
and physically capable of founding a family. But these restrictions
110 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Avery v.
State, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880). Where the
discriminatory application has been declared unconstitutional per se without any reference to a prima
facie case see Smith v. Allwriqht, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hale
v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
111 See cases cited in note 92 supra.
112 " . . . nor shall any State . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws."
113 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
114 Id. at 22.
l5Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
116 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (dictum).
117 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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are not based upon racial lines. Miscegenation laws are, and there-
fore are immediately suspect.
The fact that there is a danger that in some Southern states
white persons may stage riots in protest of an interracial marriage
is no ground for contending that the state should have the power
to prohibit such marriages. The Supreme Court has definitely de-
clared that individual rights that are protected by the Constitution
cannot be denied because there are local prejudices that refuse to
recognize those rights. In dealing with a city ordinance which pro-
hibited Negroes from living in a white neighborhood the Court said,
"This drastic measure is sought to be justified under the authority
of the state in the exercise of the police power. It is said such leg-
islation tends to promote the public peace by preventing racial con-
flicts, that it tends to maintain racial purity; ... [T] he police power,
broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinance which




Since Brown v. Board of Education, the Court has maintained
the rule that no segregation of races by state law in any kind of
public service is constitutional.' 1 9 This case overruled the doctrine
of "separate but equal facilities" which had been formulated in the
1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson.120 It would be tempting to argue
that this must impliedly affect the validity of all miscegenation
laws. There is, however, admittedly a difference between segrega-
tion in schools, buses, and recreational facilities and laws which
prohibit intermarriage. The segregation laws affected many people
in their everyday movements. Segregated public schools touch ev-
ery Negro child. It is a social phenomenon that Negroes in America
resent. Miscegenation laws, however, deal only with those relative-
ly few cases where individuals go against the community mores and
attempt to enter into an interracial relationship which is admittedly
unpopular to both Negroes and whites alike. There is less demand
for liberty here by large groups of people than in education and job
opportunities.12 1 It is significant that the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People filed briefs in all the recent
segregation cases as amicus curiae, but apparently has taken no in-
terest in recent miscegenation cases that have gone to appellate
courts. In the segregation cases the Court talked in terms of races
and whether Negroes were being discriminated against en masse.
They pointed out the bad social effects it would have on the Negro
children and how separated facilities would retard any chance of the
children to gain acceptance on an equal level with whites. A mis-
118 Buchanon v. Worley, 245 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1917). Under a plan of gradual desegregation of
schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, public hostility and threats of mob violence forced the federal
government to send troops to insure protection of the Negro children. The school board petitioned
the District Court in June, 1958, to suspend the. op~ration of the desegreqation program for two
years due to public turmoil. The request was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme
Court affirmed and held that public opposition could not deprive Negroes of their constitutional
rights. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
119 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control,
347 U.S. 971 (1954); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Tureaud v. Board
of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955); Mayor and
City of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955);
Board of Trustees of Univ. of N. Carolina v. Frasier, 350 U.S. 979 (1956); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
120 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
121 Negroes seem to demand the following social equalities (in order of decreasing preference):
(1) economic activities such as land ownership, jobs; (2) legal rights in courts; (3) political rights;
(4) use of public facilities on a non-segregated basis; (5) personal relations, eating, dancing, etc.,
with whites; (6) intermarriage and sexual relations with white people. 1 Myrdal, An American
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy 60, 61 (1944).
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cegenation law does not affect large groups of people since rela-
tively few persons have the desire to marry with a person of a dif-
ferent race. There is nothing about the nature of man that demands
this taste for his own race; it is an American problem which has its
roots in our particular social history.
Still the precise legal issue in the segregation cases was wheth-
er an individual was being denied equal protection of the laws. It
is apparent then that the difference between the two situations -
segregated schools and miscegenation laws-is a matter of degree
and not a difference of kind. The Court has held racial classifica-
tion unconstitutional even when the Court was aware that at the
time there was little demand by Negroes in general for equal facili-
ties. Thus, a railroad coach law which permitted carriers to provide
sleeping and dining cars only for white persons was a denial of
equal protection, notwithstanding the fact there was little demand
by Negroes for Pullman and dining car service. The Court re-
marked of such argument, "It makes the constitutional right depend
upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against,
where as the essence of a constitutional right is that it is a personal
one."
22
As a summary of the constitutional aspects of miscegenation
laws we can say that the burden is upon the twenty-three states
which now have them to show by competent evidence that they are
necessary to the health of the community and are not outgrowths
of the same racial antagonism that engendered school segregation
laws. Is there such evidence? If there is, will it match other evi-
dence which can be produced to show that there is no sound scien-
tific basis for such laws? And even if the Supreme Court later de-
clares that their holding in Bolling v. Sharpe that race laws are
"constitutionally suspect" did not mean that the presumption of
validity no longer attaches, is there any evidence of which the Court
can take judicial notice, as they did in Brown v. Board of Education,
that such laws are scientifically indefensible?
IV. THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF MISCEGENATION
12 3
A. Physiological Effects of Race-Crossing
Many studies have been made attempting to reveal inherent
defects in the process of amalgamation of races. R. R. Gates, a bio-
logist, wrote a book 12 4 in 1929 which has been widely cited to up-
hold the theory of racial purity. He postulated that each race of
man is actually a separate species and that some are more advanced
than others in terms of biological evolution. He did not say that all
race-crossing was to be avoided. Only when an "advanced" stock
and a very "primitive" stock interbreed do serious malefactors arise.
He said, "The racial elements of the more primitive stock will dilute
and weaken the better elements of the more progressive stock, with
a retarding or degrading effect on the progressive stock as a whole.
It is, therefore, clear that miscegenation between, for example, the
122 McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914).
123 For an excellent discussion of the scientific aspects of miscegenation, see Wirth and Goldhamer,
The Hybrid and the Problem of Miscegenation in Characteristics of the American Negro 253-370 (Kline-
berg, ed. 1944).
124 Gates, R.R., Heredity in Man (1929).
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white races and the African races-which for ages has been under-
going separate evolution-is wholly undesirable from a eugenic
viewpoint."'' 2 5 Gates does not show by statistics that such has oc-
curred. His only justification is that Mulattoes in the United States
are not socially as successful as whites. This has been shown by
many studies to be due to their inferior education, job opportuni-
ties and social status.
1 26
Furthermore, leading anthropologists deny that there is yet any
evidence justifying the notion that some races are more advanced
biologically than others.'2 7 The leading student of the evolution of
man, Franz Weidenreich, has said of Gates' theory that each race
is a separate species of animal: "Raising the differences between
racial groups to the rank of specific differences by giving those
groups specific names is nothing but an attempt to exaggerate the
dissimilarities by the application of a taxonomic trick.'' 28 Anthro-
pologists are fond of refuting the idea that Negroes are laggards in
the evolutionary process by comparing the physical traits of Ne-
groes, Caucasians, and apes. They point out that apes are very hairy
on the body, Caucasians are less hairy, and Negroes are the least
hairy. Apes have very thin lips, Caucasians thicker lips, and Ne-
groes the thickest of them all. The epidermus of the ape is chalk
white, Caucasians are slightly more pigmented, and Negroes are
dark. The hair on the head of an ape is straight, the Caucasian has
straight or wavy hair, and the Negro has kinky or woolly hair. Some
persons have tried to demonstrate that Negroes have inferior men-
tal equipment because their average brain size is smaller than the
Caucasian's.1"9 This argument backfires when it is pointed out that
the Negro "Kaffirs" and Amahora of Africa, the Japanese, the
American Indians, the Eskimos and the Polynesians all have brains
which are on the average larger than the Caucasian's. 130
An outspoken opponent of race mixture was Davenport who
made a study of race-crossing between whites and Negroes in Ja-
maica.131 He compared the hybrids with the whites and Negroes in
every conceivable way. He came to the conclusion that the arms
and legs of Negroes are longer in proportion to their trunks than
the whites and that the hybrids seemed to inherit these long legs
but the shorter arms of the Caucasians. He claimed that this was
an unnatural disharmony. Other scientists studied his findings and
thought results were plainly exaggerated-that his own statistics
showed that the order of difference in total stature was not more
than one inch,13- and the most that could be said of this was that
the half breed would be put to a slight disadvantage in picking
things up from the ground. Most scientists considered the study to
125 Id. at 329.
126 The most thorouqh studies are Klineberg: Race Differences (1935); Negro Intelligence and
Selective Migration (1935); Mental Testing of Racial and National Groups, Scientific Aspects of the
Race Problem 251-94 (1941); Race and Psychology, The Race Question in Modern Science 55-84
(UNESCO 1956). See also Characteristics of the American Negro (Klineberg ed. 1944).
127 1 Myrdal, op. cit. supra note 121, at 138, 1t3.
128 Weidenreich, Apes, Giants, and Man 2 (1946).
129 See for instance Bean, Some Racial Peculiarities of the Negro Brain, 5 American Journal of
Anatomy 353-415 (1906). Prof. Franklin P. Mall in whose laboratory at Johns Hopkins this research
was conducted was so dissatisfied with the interpretation of the evidence that he was led to investi-
gate the problem for himself. Mall, the leading anatomist of his time, came to the conclusion that
nothing at all had been proved. See Montagu Man's Most Dangerous Myth 225 (1952).
130 Far a table of cranial capacities, see Montagu, An Introduction to Physical Anthropology 336-
37 (2d ed. 1951).
131 Davenport and Steggerda, Race Crossing in Jamaica (1929).
132 Castle, Race Mixture and Physical Disharmonies, 71 Science 603-06 (1930).
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show no disadvantage in miscegenation, despite the claims of Daven-
port.133 Castle remarked, "The honestly made records of Davenport
and Steggerda tell a very different story about hybrid Jamaicans
from that which Davenport. .. tells about them in broad, sweeping
statements. The former will never reach the ears of eugenics prop-
agandists and Congressional committees; the latter will be with us
as the bogy-man of pure-race enthusiasts for the next hundred
years."
134
Several studies of mixed blood groups lend support not only
to the argument that no harm results of mixed marriages, but that
there may even be some biological advantage in being the child of
such a marriage. These studies are, on the whole, more recent than
the study made by Davenport and Steggerda which was claimed to
show bad results. 135 Probably the most interesting case history of
cross-breeding was of the descendants of the mutineers of the famed
English ship The Bounty. The mutineers settled on Pitcairn Island
in the South Pacific with Polynesian women in 1790. Isolated from
the world for over a century except for rare visits by explorers,
this colony flourished magnificently. The descendants, who are still
living there, have always had unusually long life-spans and are
taller, more vigorous, and on the whole healthier than the original
settlers. Schapiro, who has studied them,136 thinks that although
environmental factors may have contributed largely to the increased
vitality of the people, hybridization itself may have played a part.
The average generation averaged 7.44 children per family, the sec-
ond generation 9.10, and the third, 5.40. The rate in the second gen-
eration is one of the highest on record for any community and re-
flects an unusual reproduction level.
The community is free of any race tensions since all were of
mixed strains after the first settlers died out, and the people are
133 Ibid. See also Krober, Anthropology 200-01 (1948); Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit. supra note
123,, at 328.
134 Castle, op. cit. supra note 132, at 606.
135 See, e.g.. Boas, Race, Language and Culture 138-48 (1940), a study of "half-breed" Indians
show that the hybrids were taller and more fertile than the parental stocks. Fischer, Die Rehobother
Bastaards (1913) similar findings as to descendants of Dutch and Low German peasant mixture with
Hottentot women in South Africa. These two racial stocks are very dissimilar and if disharmonies
were ever likely to occur, it would be here. The descendants were well proportioned, taller, and
more fertile than the parents. Lotsy and Goddijn, Voyages of Explorations to Judge of the Bearing of
Hybridization upon Evolution (I. South Africa), 10 Genetica viii-315 (1928) showing favorable results
of race crossing among Bushmen, Basontas. Mongoloids, Caucasians and others. Pourchet, Brazilian
Mestizo Types, V Handbook of South American Indians 111-20 (1950) and Freyre, The Masters and the
Slaves (1946); both studies are of the mixed bloods of Negroes, Indians and Caucasians in Brazil.
Keesing, The Changing Maori (1928), race crossing in New Zealand. Adams, Interracial Marriage in
Hawaii (1937). Krauss, Race Crossing in Hawaii, 32 Journal of Heredity 371-78 (1941).
136 Schapiro, H. The Heritage of the Bounty. The story of Pitcairn through six generations (1936).
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unusually peaceful. Crime is a rare occurrence. A democratic rule
developed early with all men and women enjoying equal political
rights, long before political rights were granted to women in the
western world. All children were required to attend school until
the age of sixteen.
The most important works on the physical characteristics of
American Negroes and Mulattoes are by Day 137 and Herskovitz.138
Although the purpose of their studies was not to prove or disprove
the danger of miscegenation, they found, incidentally, that there
was no sign of evolutionary retrogression in Mulattoes or decrease
in fecundity.
Geneticists agree with the foregoing findings by anthropolo-
gists. The works of Dunn and Dobzhansky 139 may be summarized
thusly: (a) miscegenation has existed since the beginning of human
life, (b) miscegenation results in greater somatic and psychic varia-
bility and allows of the emergence of a great variety of new gene
patterns which are more easily adapted to new environments, (c)
biologically speaking, miscegenation is neither good nor bad, al-
though there is evidence in some cases of hybrid vigor, (d) an over-
whelming number of modern geneticists refute the theory that mis-
cegenation causes retrogression.
B. Mentality of Racial Hybrids
Let it be said from the outset that very little work has been
done in the field of psychology on the question of intelligence of
Mulattoes. Most of the following discussion will of necessity deal
with studies that include Negroes and Mulattoes compared as a
group with the whites' performance on the mental tests.
Klineberg has demonstrated that the inferiority of the average
Negro in mental tests results from social environment which is
largely deleterious to Negro children except possibly in certain large
cities in northern states.140 This was demonstrated, for instance, in
World War I (comparable studies were not made in World War II)
when aptitude tests were given to inductees and the scores were
correlated with race. The average Negro from Ohio scored higher
than the average white person from any one of the Southern
states1 41 Thus, if we take a Negro and compare his score with a
white from another part of the country, there is revealed the strong
influence that one's socio-economic surroundings play in his mental
alertness. Klineberg's later work 142 on this subject fully confirmed
the indications of the Army tests. To guard against the element of
selective migration-i.e. "the smart Negroes went north and left
the dumb ones behind"-Klineberg took the scores of Negro chil-
dren after they had recently moved to the North. There was no
difference between their scores and the Southern Negro children's
137 Day, C. B. A study of Some Negro-White Families in the United States, 10 Harvard African
Studies (1932).
138 Herskovitz, M. The Anthropometry of the American Negro (1930).
139 Dunn, L. C. and T. Dobzhansky, Heredity, Race and Society (1951). See also Boyd, W. C.Genetics and the Race of Man (1950).140 Klineberg, Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration (1935); Peterson, Mental Measurement
Monographs No. 5 (1929).
141 See Appendix IIl.
142 Klineberg, op. cit. supra note 140.
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scores. Then, in an extensive battery of tests, he showed that the
longer the children lived in northern cities the higher they scored.
With only minute deviations, his results showed a close relationship
between mental test scores and length of residence in the favorable
environment. 14 3 He makes the cautious statement that "even under
these better environmental conditions Negro children do not on the
average quite reach the white norms. Since the environment of the
New York Negro child is by no means the same as that of the white,
except perhaps as far as schooling is concerned, this result does not
prove that the Negro is incapable of reaching the white level.
144
Early studies by Ferguson 145 showed a pronounced correlation
in Mulattoes' scores between the degree of white blood and mental
scores. The same correlation was found of half-breed Indians. The
results were interpreted by many to demonstrate that whites pos-
sessed a greater inherent mental capacity than Indians and Negroes,
and thus was transmitted genetically to the mixed blood group.146
Klineberg's more careful investigations show that it is equally pos-
sible to account for the correlation by the fact that mixed bloods
have a higher socio-economic position in society than full blooded
Indians and Negroes. Of course, any argument that it is the Ne-
groes' own fault that they have a lower status is totally unrealistic.
They were originally brought into a strange culture against their
will and had no opportunity to benefit from the advantages of the
advanced civilization as long as they had no legal rights as slaves.
Since the emancipation of the slaves, it is rarely that whites have
given them any positive help to improve their social environment.
And it is a mistake to believe that western civilization was more
advanced because it was composed of Caucasian peoples. Culture
does not depend on race. Any historian can readily recall examples
in antiquity where leading cultures of yesterday were composed of
people who today are of relatively less advanced countries. Egypt
and Greece are the prime examples.
In the World War I Army examinations, some attempt was
made to separate the scores of Negro recruits into those of darker-
skinned and lighter-skinned subgroups, the latter containing those
estimated to be Mulattoes or less than one-half Negro. The light-
colored groups scored about 50, the dark-colored groups only 30.147
The consensus seems to be that this is largely due to environmental
influences. Kroeber explains how this may have come about:
But the Mulattoes of slavery days were likely to be
house servants, brought up with the Master family, absorb-
ing manners, information, perhaps education; their black
half-brothers and half-sisters stayed out in the plantation
shacks. Several generations have elapsed since those days,
but it is probable that the descendants of Mulattoes have
143 See Appendix II.
144 Klineberg, op. cit. supro note 110, at 59.
145 Ferguson, G. 0. The Psychology of the Negro, Archives of Psychology, No. 36.
146 Garth, Race Psychology (1931).
147 Kroeber, op. cit. supro note 133, at 198.
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kept a step or two ahead of the descendants of the pure
blacks in literacy, range of experience and the like. It is
well known that modern American Negroes tend to accord
higher status among themselves to the lighter-skinned
Caucasian-featured individuals. Successful Negroes tend to
marry light-colored spouses. A light skin and a convex
nose count for almost as much as a good education or suc-
cessful parents-both among Negroes themselves in their in-
ternal social cleavages, and in getting jobs or other oppor-
tunities from Whites.
148
It is clear, anyway, that the racists' claim that miscegenation
produces children inferior to both parental groups has absolutely
no foundation in fact. Not only are the children's physical char-
acteristics intermediate between the Negro and Caucasian charac-
teristics, but their mental test scores lie between the respective
norms.
C. Personality Traits
Some writers149 have contended that the fact that there is a so-
cial stratification in the Negro culture whereby Mulattoes are a
somewhat distinctive group, leads to tension in the Mulatto's life
which is manifested by a higher degree of mental illness than
among the darker Negroes. There is no evidence to support this
theory, however. One possibility of testing this contention was at-
tempted by a sociologist who studied the relation of insanity and
Negro neighborhoods in Chicago. 150 He found an inverse ratio be-
tween insanity rates and the neighborhood economic level. Since the
Mulattoes occupy the upper levels of the economic scale it would
seem that they would have lower insanity rates.
The suggestion that Mulattoes have a higher rate of criminal
activity has been challenged by a study similar to the one above.
Frazier found that in Chicago there was an inverse relation be-
tween crime rates and the socio-economic status of the neighbor-
hood. Since he also found that more Mulattoes live in the better
neighborhoods, it is unlikely that there is any truth in the conten-
tion that they tend towards criminality.
151
White supremacists reveal an inconsistent hypocrisy when they
first defend miscegenation laws on the ground that it will prove
harmful to both races and when they try to explain how it is that
some Negroes have achieved noteworthy success in professional,
scientific, and artistic fields. Their stock explanation here is that
the successful ones are successful because they have some white
blood in their veins. If they back down part of the way and say
that miscegenation lowers only the standards of the white race,
then they have admitted that the laws are based on the theory that
the white race is superior and must be protected regardless of in-
di'idual liberties.
148 Id. at 199.
149 See for example, Stonequist, E. V., The Marginal Man (1937).
150 Rosenthal, Racial Difference in the Incidence of Mental Disease, Journal of Negro Education
484 (1934).
151 Frazier, The Negro Family in the United States (1939). Another study by Hooton shows similar
results, Crime and the Man (1939).
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To demonstrate that Mulattoes have achieved a high status in
the Negro population, Reuter took compilations of Negro leaders
from various history books, biographical encyclopedias, Who's Who,
etc. Through interviews and investigation he determined which
ones were Mulattoes. For the purpose of his study Reuter defined a
Mulatto as "a Negro with sufficient admixture of white blood to
readily distinguish him from Negroes of pure stock." His figures
show that of the persons listed, there was one black to fourteen
Mulattoes in the various biographical reference books, and one black
to nine Mulattoes in selected history books.1 52 Although estimates
of the number of Mulattoes in America vary widely, it is clear that
they do not outnumber full-blooded Negroes by such ratios. Al-
though Reuter earlier accounted for this superiority in achievement
because of genetic differences, 153 he later changed his viewpoint and
recognized the importance of social and economic advantages of the
Mulatto which have been present since before the Civil War.154 For
instance according to the 1850 census, 581 of every 1000 free Negroes
were Mulattoes, and only 83 of every 1000 slaves were Mulattoes.
The significance of Reuter's study for our purposes is the definite
showing that Mulattoes are not social outcasts of both white and
Negro people. There are absolutely no grounds for the argument
that offspring of interracial marriages will suffer because they are
not of "Pure" Race.
V. CONCLUSION
The dignity of a democratic people cannot reconcile itself with
the invidious concept of bigotry. Our Constitution does not tolerate
statutes and decisions which tend to maintain an unwarranted
dominance by one race over others. The day has not yet come, how-
ever, when an American can hold his head high when he hears that
this is the land of the free. Sooner or later he will. Sooner or later
all laws which flaunt the democratic ideal will be abolished. Event-
ually, we predict, our Supreme Court will declare miscegenation
laws unconstitutional. We remain-only waiting for the word, only
hoping for the time.
152 Reuter, The Mulatto in the United States 212, 245 (1918).
153 Reuter, Race Mixture, Studies in Intermarriage and Miscegenation 129-163 (1931).
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Appendix II*
Klineberg's statistics of the development of New York City Negro children born in the
South who moved North.
Years in New York City Average I.Q.
I or 2 72
3 or 4 76
5 or 6 84
7 or 8 or 9 92
Born in the North 92
*Source: a summary of statistics found in Klineberg,
Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration (1935 ).
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*Sources: Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth
161 (1952).
Negroes
Median score
45.35
42.25
41.35
38.60
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